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Abstract
This article argues that phenomenological sociology has great potential to provide a
strong theoretical support to the Sociocognitive Approach (SCA) in Critical Discourse
Studies. SCA is interested in the interconnections between knowledge, discourse and
society while placing subjectivity in the centre of its framework. It looks into the
correlative relationship between personal- and socially shared knowledge, and the
significance of these correlations to discourse production and interpretation. Analo-
gously, phenomenological sociology explores the interrelated structures of subjectivity,
knowledge and the social world. It systematically analyses the conditions and forms of
intersubjective understanding and the mutually constitutive relationship between
subjective- and objective knowledge. Given the considerable overlap between the
subject matter of phenomenological sociology and that of SCA, the purpose of the
article is to draw the attention of critical discourse analysts to a neglected but extremely
resourceful field. Following a brief introduction to SCA, the article will address some
of SCA’s key concepts in conjunction with the phenomenological-sociological insight.
Keywords Critical discourse studies . Legitimation .Mental models . Phenomenological
sociology . Schutz . Sociocognitive approach
1 Introduction
Critical Discourse Studies, also known as Critical Discourse Analysis, is a multi-
methodical and multidisciplinary field interested in the discursive manifestation and
reproduction of dominance, social control, power abuse, and of social inequalities. It is
primarily interested in discourses produced by social actors who control public
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discourse, such as the political elite, business corporations or the media. Critical
Discourse Studies takes discourse as a form of social practice and analyses its relation-
ship with the social structures by which it is shaped. Critical discourse analysts
typically inquire about, for example, the discursive legitimation and persuasion strat-
egies of right-wing populist parties, and the impact of anti-immigrant/racist discourses
on the community in the prevailing socio-political context (Wodak and Meyer 2015;
Van Dijk 2011, 2015a).
Within the overall framework of Critical Discourse Studies, the Sociocognitive
Approach (hereinafter SCA) developed by Teun A. van Dijk focuses on the cognitive
aspects of discourse production and comprehension (Van Dijk 2014a, b, 2015a, 2018).
Van Dijk argues there is no direct or linear correspondence between discourse struc-
tures and social structures but discourses function through a cognitive interface: “the
mental representations of language users as individuals and as social members” (Van
Dijk 2015a p. 64). As Van Dijk points out, although discourse is socially conditioned
and impacts upon the functioning of the society, both the formulation and interpretation
of discourse is the aggregate function of the participants’ underlying cognitive pro-
cesses, personal- and socially shared knowledge:
Discourse is thus defined as a form of social interaction in society and at the same
time as the expression and reproduction of social cognition. Local and global
social structures condition discourse but they do so through the cognitive medi-
ation of the socially shared knowledge, ideologies and personal mental models of
social members as they subjectively define communicative events as context
models. (Van Dijk 2014a, p. 12)
SCA’s aim is (1) to track down and map the network of knowledge, beliefs, prejudices,
attitudes that are directly or indirectly operationalised and triggered by individuals
when producing and interpreting discourse, and (2) explain how that cognitive appa-
ratus actually determine discourse structures and their interpretation in a particular
communicative situation. Using the example above, SCA would be interested in why
leaders of right-wing political parties address their supporters in the way in which they
do, and how people make sense of such discourse.
SCA is widely applied by critical discourse scholars due to its broad and integrative
perspective. Van Dijk emphasizes that the framework he offers is not a method; it does
not prescribe a step-by-step procedure for discourse analysis (Van Dijk 2014a, p. 10).
Rather, it draws on a multitude of methods and concepts from wide ranging disciplines,
such as social psychology, cognitive psychology, anthropology, sociolinguistics and
sociology, all of which are instrumental in understanding the role of knowledge in
discourse production and comprehension in a given society. Although SCA is, perhaps,
the most comprehensive of its kind, one might wonder why phenomenological sociol-
ogy, i.e. Alfred Schutz’s phenomenologically founded sociology has gone off the radar.
SCA defines itself as a “particular application” of the social constructionist tradition in
social theory for that matter (Van Dijk 2018, p. 28). When setting the scene for SCA,
Van Dijk maintains: “it is not the social situation that influences (or is influenced by)
discourse, but the way the participants define such a situation” (Van Dijk 2008, p. x).
Although Van Dijk notes that this thesis would be obvious for phenomenological
sociologists, he does not explain what he means by this, nor does he draw on
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phenomenological sociology in the forthcoming discussion. Nevertheless, the central
thesis of SCA, in fact, relates to the most basic problems of phenomenological
sociology: intersubjective understanding, the relationship between subjective and ob-
jective knowledge, and our own constitutive role in the construction of social meaning,
situations, i.e. social reality. SCA also draws on Conversation Analysis, a field that
evolved from Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, which was predominantly based
on Schutz’s phenomenological sociology. However, the purpose of this article is not to
trace back certain concepts of SCA to phenomenological sociology. Rather, it draws on
various concepts developed by Schutz and his successors, Thomas Luckmann and
Peter Berger, that are relevant and might be productively integrated into Van Dijk’s
framework. Following a brief introduction to SCA, the article will discuss some of the
key concepts used by SCA and introduce their quasi-counterpart (at least complement)
in phenomenological sociology. It is out of scope to provide a thorough introduction to
Schutz’s framework, nor is my list of relevant concepts discussed below by any means
comprehensive. I offer just one alternative selection; many others are possible, both in
terms of Van Dijk’s framework and the corresponding literature of phenomenological
sociology.
However, it would not be a far-fetched objection against my proposal if one argued
that phenomenological sociology hardly has anything to offer for SCA, as its episte-
mological grounding is fundamentally distinct from that of the latter. Although the
second part of this concern would be difficult to argue with, it does not necessarily
imply incompatibility (Gallagher 1997, 2012). While empirical science takes for
granted the object of its investigation (and that it can be investigated and understood),
the phenomenological perspective is situated in a transcendental dimension and focused
on the a priori conditions of how acquiring this knowledge of the natural/social world
is, in the first place, possible (Zahavi 2019, pp. 44–55; 2004; Gurwitsch 1978,
Natanson 1973). Phenomenology “probes” the meaning and validity of empirical facts
(Natanson 1973, pp. 34–35), and shed light on the “intrinsic” characteristics of
experience and understanding (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012, pp. 1–11). This is why
Zahavi argues that positive sciences in general, and cognitive sciences in particular, can
benefit from phenomenology, because phenomenology can “elucidate” and clarify the
theoretical concepts and assumptions about perception and consciousness made by the
former (Zahavi 2004). Taking this argument as a point of departure, the article provides
an insight into why phenomenological sociology is relevant to, and could potentially be
operationalised by, SCA contributing to its already existing strengths.
There have already been attempts to integrate phenomenological sociology and
discourses studies (Keller et al. 2018). This can sensibly be done within the framework
of SCA nonetheless, developing a separate approach is not necessarily warranted.
2 Intersubjective understanding and the problem of intendedmeaning
2.1 SCA
To genuinely understand why a particular speech or text is structured in the way it is,
researchers need to reconstruct the motives, interests, intentions and goals of the
speaker. Conversely, to understand why and how discourse influences social actors
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as its audience, it is crucial to clarify why and how the content is relevant and
comprehensible to the receiver. To put it simply, the puzzle SCA is interested in is
what the speaker has in mind and how it is decoded by the receiver. Van Dijk argues
that participants of communicative situations, for an effective interaction, need to
“read” each other’s mind in a metaphorical sense. To understand actions, including
communicative actions, an intention has to be “attributed” to the observed conducts of
the actors (Van Dijk 2012b). Speakers adjust their style, selection of words to the
presumed interests, relevance and knowledge of the receiver to make sure their
intention is intelligible to the latter. However, as Van Dijk notes, intentions themselves
are not “observable”; they can only be, more or less accurately, “inferred” by the
receiver (Van Dijk 2012a, b). It generally holds that both the speaker and the receiver
construct subjectively meaningful mental models of one another’s intentions, identity,
knowledge and of the entire setting to decrypt each other’s messages and navigate in
the communicative situation (Van Dijk 2012b, 2015b).
2.1.1 Mental models
As Van Dijk maintains, mental models “define and control our everyday perception
and interaction in general and the production and comprehension of discourse in
particular” (Van Dijk 2014a, p. 49). We create mental models based on our past
experiences stored in the Episodic or Autobiographical Memory. Mental models are
“subjective representations of events or situations” with a schematic structure allowing
us to categorise and identify ongoing experiences. This subjective representation also
consists of the particular and personal emotions, opinions, sounds, gestures, visions
accompanying the situation in which the experience unfolds (Van Dijk 2018). Van Dijk
points out that the significance of a car, for example, varies when driving for pleasure
and when cycling in traffic. Van Dijk calls this phenomenon “the multi-modal nature of
knowledge” which derives from various emotions and sensory experiences (Van Dijk
2012a). Navigating in the communicative situation, participants dynamically draw on
and “update” their mental models, discourse thus becomes subjectively meaningful. In
fact, as we shall see later, revision is needed only if a preliminary available mental
model is not sufficient enough to make sense of something, and/or shows inconsistency
with one’s total configuration of experiences that are relevant in the context of the
particular situation. Due to the uniqueness of mental models, the participants’ respec-
tive interpretation of the same discourse is necessarily different (Van Dijk 2018).
The main two types of mental models that SCA defines are situation models and
context models. Situation models or semantic models represent the individuals’ sub-
jective understanding of the situation, or their take on the subject matter, i.e. what the
discourse is about, or the experience aims at. Semantic models are the cognitive
correlates of the “intentional” and “referential” function of language. Context models
or pragmatic models account for how individuals define the circumstances of an
experience or the communicative situation in which they are involved in terms of
relevance. Context models represent the “socially” and “communicatively” relevant
characteristics of a situation. They help to avoid ambiguity and orient participants to act
and speak appropriately (i.e. accordingly) in a particular social situation. They control
the content, style and genre of discourses, depending on spatio-temporal factors, the
institutional environment, the identity, status and role of participants, and their
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relationship. For example, we explain the circumstances of the same accident to a
friend in a different manner than to the police (Van Dijk 2014b, 2015b, 2018).
Although uniquely constructed, mental models are based on, and “instantiated”
from, the socially shared generic knowledge of the participants which manifests in
language. Thus, language is indicative of, and makes the subjective interpretations of
participants mutually accessible. Essentially this is why individuals, using the same
language, can understand each other in a conversation (Van Dijk 2014a, 2018, pp. 49–
61, 2012a, 2014b).
Van Dijk has criticised cognitive- and social psychology for neglecting the socially
shared nature of knowledge and the knowledge-based interaction between members of
epistemic communities respectively. He claims that paying more attention to these
issues, and an analysis of how mental models function, i.e. the processes underlying
discourse production and comprehension, would be instrumental in bridging the
“notorious micro-macro gap” in social sciences (Van Dijk 2012a, 2014a, pp. 12–13).
I will demonstrate that phenomenological sociology could step up as a resourceful ally
to SCA in this regard, as their fields of interests intersect significantly. The article will
go on to introduce Schutz’s insight into the (in) accessibility of others’ intentions, and,
drawing on his analysis of intersubjective understanding, it will address the process that
controls discourse production and interpretation, and the function of language. The
second part of the article will discuss some of SCA’s key concepts, such as personal-
and socially shared knowledge, and legitimation from a phenomenological sociological
perspective.
2.2 Alfred Schutz
Schutz was interested in the role of subjectivity in the construction of social reality, and,
conversely, how individuals’ understandings and actions are influenced by socially pre-
established structures (Schutz 1970, pp. 25, 79–122; cf. Zahavi 2019, pp. 106–107;
Overgaard and Zahavi 2009). Schutz argued that the social world is constituted and
manifests in the first-person perspective; it appears intelligibly only through subjective
interpretations, in the subjective meaning-context of lived experiences. Thus, according
to Schutz, in order to understand how society functions, social sciences should focus on
the individual to whom it meaningfully exists (Schutz 1972, pp. 74–86, 139–144;
Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 15–18).
Schutz’s point of departure was his criticism of Max Weber’s social action
theory. Weber recognised the fundamental role of subjectivity in the constitution
of social reality: the meaning of social relations and structures is derivative of, and
reducible to, as Weber calls it, the “intended meaning” individuals “attach” to
their own acts. Thus, Weber argued that sociologists can only understand and
describe the former through the interpretation of the latter. While Schutz agreed
with the key tenet of Weber’s framework, he problematised that the “intended”, or
more accurately, the subjective meaning of an action had not been addressed by
Weber in its actual complexity. Weber did not differentiate between the meaning
of our own acts and that of others. Nor did he explain how these meanings are
constituted, established and interpreted, and the different forms in which the other
self is given to the self; i.e. how we come to understand others in the first place.
Schutz points out that Weber’s failure to adequately conceptualise these issues has
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led to inconsistencies and contradictions in his theory. As he argued, it is only
through a systematic analysis of the concept of meaning and the process of
meaning-constitution that we can understand “the intended meaning” of an action,
hence the meaning-structure of the social world (Schutz 1972, pp. 1–20).
2.2.1 Meaning-constitution and the subjectively meaningful action
To explicate meaning Schutz adopts and combines Husserl’s concept of meaning-
endowment and Bergson’s concept of inner duration (Schutz 1972, pp. 45–57). For our
purpose it suffices to establish that, for Schutz, meaning is the “reflective Act of
attention” which “singles out” an experience from the otherwise unnoticed flow of
experiences (Ibid, pp. 51, 65, 71). Thus turning attention to and distinguishing an
experience within the stream of consciousness, it becomes “constituted” or “discrete”.
What is decisive, as Schutz notes, is that only a past experience can be meaningful: “for
meaning is merely an operation of intentionality, which, however, only becomes visible
to the reflective glance” (Ibid, p.52). Instead of being an intrinsic feature of the
experience itself, meaning is the way in which one turns towards one’s own elapsed
experiences. Thus, the reflective attention presupposes a particular attitude on the part
of the self (Ibid, pp. 42, 69).
Schutz, drawing on Husserl, defines behaviour as a “meaning endowing conscious
experience” or an “attitudinal Act”. Behaviour is a discrete unity of experiences
resulting from a spontaneous activity. It is distinguished from other experiences by
virtue of the particular attitude one takes up when reflecting on that activity. Because
activity is a process, a series of experiences, the self can only reflect on it from a
“vantage point” by means of “retentions” (like a freeze-frame) or “recollections”. One
may recollect a behaviour from memory by a unified “single grasp” (“monothetically”)
or phase-by-phase reconstructing the original structure of the experience
(“polythetically”) (Schutz 2011, pp. 137–142; 1982, pp. 46–47; 1972, pp. 53–57, 71;
Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 53–56).
Actions, as opposed to behaviours, do not only consist of an attitude but also a
“project”; actions are future-oriented in the form of a plan or a goal in order to solve
a problem. This anticipatory character of an action is only seemingly inconsistent
with the retrospective nature of reflection. Reflection, besides retentions and recol-
lections, functions by means of “protentions”. In protentions, the self reflects on the
action as something that will have been done as a completed unit, i.e. in the future
perfect tense. The meaning of an action is “its corresponding projected act”. The
scope or breadth of reflection (i.e. the project) is crucial concerning the meaning of
an action. Schutz emphasizes that the act as a unit is divisible into potentially
infinite subacts, and each can be regarded as a unit itself. For an external observer, it
is impossible to identify the actual phase that is momentarily relevant for the actor
within the overall spectrum. Observing a woodcutter chopping logs with an axe,
one might come to the conclusion he is chopping logs with an axe, while the
woodcutter himself is actually working to get paid, so that he can get a chainsaw,
work more, start his own logging company, and so on; perhaps he is not even a
woodcutter, just a man working out. It follows that meanings cannot be arbitrarily
“attached” to actions as they are meaningless without the anticipated project
(Schutz 1972, pp. 24–31, 57–71).
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2.2.2 Specific meaning and the relevance of relevance
As already implied, the specific meaning of an action may vary and depends on the
particular mode of attention and its “modifications” and the corresponding attitude one
takes up at the particular moment of reflection. The perspective of attention and the
degree of scrutiny is determined by my particular pragmatic interest in the particular
situation (Schutz 1972, pp. 71–96). This already explains Van Dijk’s car-driving
example; the role of interest in meaning-constitution needs further clarification
nonetheless.
An experience is always constituted in the context of past constituted experiences.
That is, the meaning of an experience is always determined in the configuration of
previous lived experiences that are synthesized in the stock of knowledge as meaning-
contexts. To identify an object as a car, I refer back to the configuration of my previous
experiences of cars. Meaning-contexts conceptually encompasses and defines the
“essence” of an experience and are called interpretive schemes or types. The structure
of the stock of knowledge will be explained in more detail later. What is important here,
as Schutz points out, is that the specific meaning of a new experience is essentially
constituted by a “passive synthesis of recognition”, i.e. the reflective glance of the ego
to its own stock of knowledge. Synthetic recognition is the classification or “self-
explication” of the lived experience, whereby experiences are compared to schemes for
a match; interpretation is thus “the referral of the unknown to the known” (Schutz 2011,
p. 105; 1972, pp. 83–84). The stock of knowledge comprises all the possible schemes
(and the corresponding attitudes) ever applied in previous situations involving a car:
driving home from IKEA - means of transport; changing the oil - machine; being hit
while cycling - hazard, and so on. Each of these schemes has interpretative relevance
as far as cars are concerned; i.e. they all are on the horizon or the interpretive spectrum
of the experiential object which features the basic characteristics typical to a car. To
decide which one of them defines a particular situation depends on my prevailing
interest. As earlier discussed, the meaning of an action is the projected act, i.e. the goal
or “in-order-to motive” of the action. Schutz thus refers to the meaning context which
determines the meaning of the action as “motivational context”. In other words, the
specific meaning of an action is constituted in the motivationally relevant meaning-
context of past experiences that corresponds with the projected act. Motivational
relevance also consists of a “because-of motive” which in hindsight explains and
determines the projected act based on previous experiences; i.e. why the problem is
important in the first place. I use my car in order to get a cupboard home from IKEA,
because cupboards are heavy and cars are handy to carry heavy things. This system of
motivational relevance that guide us to master a situation and solve a problem called
interest (Schutz 1966, p. 123; Schutz 1972, pp. 74–96; 2011, p. 129).
If an experience does not, or not sufficiently, fit an interpretive scheme in the stock
of knowledge, it becomes problematic or thematically relevant. Thematic- or topical
relevance accounts for, inter alia, singling out an experience from the flow of experi-
ences, as something unfamiliar that catches our attention (Schutz and Luckmann 1974,
pp. 186–189). Schutz differentiates between imposed- and intrinsic topical relevance.
In the former case, experiences become thematic for a reason out of our control, in the
latter, we make an experience thematic voluntarily. Each form of thematic relevance
has its own sub-categories. A specific category of intrinsic relevance is when we
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“enlarge or deepen” the prevailing theme and customize interpretive schemes accord-
ingly. When purchasing a car, we are never looking for just a car, but are also interested
in the make and model of the car, its body style, fuel consumption, storage capacity and
so on, depending on our purpose of use. The car as the “paramount theme” remains the
same, the possibilities for “sub-thematization” within the spectrum of its inner horizon,
i.e. for classifying its intrinsic content, are virtually infinite. This explains how interest
controls the degree of scrutiny and hence determines the constitution of meaning as
mentioned earlier (Schutz 2011, pp. 107–112; Schutz 1971 pp. 120–134; 1966, pp.
116–132).
Thematic-, motivational- and interpretative relevance are interconnected together,
and with interpretive schemes and types stored in the stock (Schutz 2011, pp. 123–150;
1972, p. 193; 1962, pp. 283–286; Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 182–229). What is
problematic for me, why I become interested in, and how I manage to get a grasp of
certain problems, all depend on my past experiences (and the lack of them), i.e. my
current stock of knowledge. Conversely, it follows that the learning process, hence the
“chronological” or “autobiographical” structure of my knowledge is a function of my
jointly sedimented relevance. Relevance are thus of great importance in Schutz’s
theoretical framework (cf. Dreher 2011; Nasu 2008). It is the interrelated structures
of relevance that accounts for the habitual and stereotypical knowledge we rely on to
navigate in everyday (communicative) situations and, ultimately, in the social world;
and as such, explains the function of SCA’s context models.
2.2.3 Intersubjective understanding
As Schutz maintains, due to the highly complex and necessarily subjective nature of
meaning-constitution (retentions, polythetic acts of recollections, protentions, and so
on), the intended meaning of an individual is inaccessible to others in the exact form in
which it is constituted within one’s stream of consciousness. Individuals’ self-
explication of their own lived experience and its interpretation by an observer always
occur in totally different meaning-contexts. Moreover, as an observer, I cannot be
certain whether one in fact reflects upon one’s own lived experience in the sense
necessary to constitute an action as defined earlier, and how (i.e. in what exact
meaning-context). Observable bodily movements, expressions are merely the “indica-
tions” of one’s subjective meaning. According to Schutz, it is nonetheless possible to
understand others’ subjective meaning, their motives, whys and purposes and get an
insight into one’s own meaning contexts. However, it is only partly achievable and is
always approximate, and observers must rely on the interpretation of their own lived
experiences (Schutz 1972, pp. 97–115).
Schutz distinguishes between “expressive movements” and “expressive acts”. While
the former are meaningful only for the observer, the latter have a communicative
purpose. Expressive acts are communicative acts whose in-order-to motive is to inform,
or more precisely, to be interpreted. Hence, expressive acts use objectified sign-systems
such as language. On the one hand, signs serve as interpretive schemes for the lived
experiences which they designate. On the other hand, through their “expressive
function”, signs indicate or “appresent” the subjective meaning of sign users. To
understand each other in communication, the interpretive- and expressive schemes of
the participants must match. However, even if we speak the same language, these
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frames never fully overlap due to the differences in the biographical situation of the
participants. As Schutz underlines, whenever we use or interpret a word, its actual
meaning always points back to the unique circumstances of the situation in which we
learned to use it, or in which we have since been using it. That is, words, besides their
objective meaning (dictionary entry)1 also have a subjective component. To genuinely
understand one another, interpreters must try to detect the particular subjective expe-
rience of the speakers in the situation when speakers link the sign and the signified; i.e.
when they “establish” the meaning of the sign (Schutz 1972, pp. 116–125; 1970, pp.
202–207; 1962, pp. 294–315; Schutz and Luckmann 1989, pp. 148–153). Not only
that, the meaning of a word is also “occasional” and is determined by the overall
discursive context. As Schutz maintains: “discourse is a sign-using act” (Schutz 1972,
p. 125). That is, the meaning of a word gradually develops over the span of the project
in which it is embedded, i.e. in the meaning-context of the sentence, the paragraph, and
so on. As long as the discourse as a unit is not completed, the interpreter may only have
a provisional understanding of its meaning.
As Schutz points out, when interpreting someone, we always try to put ourselves
into the shoes of the speaker to imagine why they formulate their thoughts as they do.
Conversely, as speakers we try to select our words so that the interpreter can easily
understand our point, attitudes, feelings, based on our past experiences of interpreting
others. In both cases, the participants try to replicate each other’s interpretive and
expressive scheme respectively, and in doing so they draw on their knowledge of one
another (identity, speaking habits, interpretation skills, knowledge). Although this
knowledge evolves in the communicative situation, the “imaginative reconstruction”
of the speaker’s project can never be fully achieved by the interpreter, nor can the
speaker be certain whether they are fully understood. It nonetheless follows that the
“degree of anonymity” or “intimacy” of communication between participants signifi-
cantly affects the understanding of one’s intended or subjective meaning (Schutz 1972,
pp. 126–138).
Schutz calls the basic form of attention by which we turn towards others’ stream of
consciousness Other-orientation. Every social interaction is a reciprocal Other-
orientation when the participants’ motive to be understood mutually and dynamically
affects communication; the in-order-to motive of my question becomes the because-of
motive of your answer. Social interaction is thus “an intersubjective motivational
context” (Schutz 1972, pp. 146–159). When the other is physically present, we talk
about Thou-orientation. The archetype of all forms of social relationship is a reciprocal
Thou-orientation, i.e. the face-to-face, direct relationship, where our streams of con-
sciousness are interlocked, and we are “growing older together” in a We-relationship
(Schutz 1972, pp. 103, 163–164; 1962, pp. 218–222). As Schutz points out, it is only
the We-relationship where we have the chance to live through one’s action up to the
fulfillment of the projected act. Because we share the same environment in living
through our experiences as one single flow, we are in a position to synchronise our
expressive- and interpretive schemes; we may as well ask each other questions if we are
1 I defined the objective meaning of a word as its dictionary entry for the sake of simplicity. Schutz’s concept
of objective meaning is more complex than that and might occasionally be confusing when he uses objective
meaning as the observer’s interpretation of the actor’s action (i.e. the observer’s self-explication of their own
lived experiences) - for clarification see Yu (2010).
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unsure about our interpretation. In each moment of the face-to-face encounter our
knowledge of each other is being revised and updated (Ibid, pp. 159–172; cf. Zahavi
2014, pp. 141–144).
Schutz refers to the participants of a We-relationship as each other’s associates or
consociates. Besides our associates, we have social relationships with our contempo-
raries, predecessors and successors (Schutz 1972, pp. 8, 109, 142–143). Although
different in character, each of these relationships is derivative of the We-relationship.
How we understand social structures is virtually equivalent with the way in which we
understand our contemporaries, those with whom we coexist in time but are not in a
face-to-face relationship. Schutz calls this specific form of Other-orientation They-
orientation. The world of contemporaries spans a wide spectrum of anonymity: a
friend with whom I had lunch yesterday; a group of individuals whom I do not know
by name only identify by function, such as postmen; collective entities, such as nations
or states; or the unknown maker of the vase standing in my living room (Ibid, pp. 180–
183). As Schutz points out, since we have no direct access to the flow of experiences of
our contemporaries, to understand them, we can solely rely on our own abstract,
synthesized experiences of the social world in general; the typical characteristics of
people we have encountered. That is, we understand contemporaries by means of
interpretive schemes called personal ideal types. Schutz differentiates between char-
acterological types and habitual types. The former encompasses the typical character-
istics of persons who behave or act in a certain way, the latter refers to functions and
roles, such as the postman. As Schutz notes, although ideal types that define social
collectivities are characterised by a much higher degree of anonymity, are merely an
“abbreviation” for the complex network of personal ideal types of their members
(Schutz 1972, p. 184, 196–199; cf. Zahavi 2014, p. 145).
What is important is that ideal types become integrated parts of the stock of
knowledge, and we draw on them not only in They-relations, but also in face-to-face
interactions (Schutz 1972, pp. 185–186). Whenever we step in a We-relationship, we
always take up a specific preliminary attitude and presuppose a set of because- and in-
order-to motives relevant in the situation determined by ideal types (Schutz 1972, pp.
171–172). The difference between face-to-face and indirect interactions is rather
“gradual” than “categorical” if not insignificant (Knoblauch 2013). As Zahavi com-
ments, the understanding of others in everyday life never takes place in a “vacuum”
(Zahavi 2014, p. 146). It is precisely our integrated network of ideal types as meaning
contexts that control the communicative situation, and automatically adjust a corre-
sponding attitude depending on whether we are interacting with our friend or the police.
Thus, the function of Schutz’s ideal types are nothing less than that of SCA’s context
models.
2.2.4 Types
Not only our contemporaries and associates but virtually everything we encounter in
both the physical and social world is interpreted in terms of types; no experience is
“pretypical” (Schutz 2011, p. 125; 1962, pp. 281–282; Schutz and Luckmann 1974, p.
232). To a certain extent, every experience seems familiar from the outset, because we
can typify them based on our previous experiences: “What is newly experienced, is
already known in the sense that it recalls similar or equal things formerly perceived”
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(Schutz 1970, p. 116). Whenever we see a dog, even if we cannot tell what breed at first
sight, we know it is a dog. Types are “taken for granted” on the common-sense level,
and mainly derive from our socio-cultural heritage passed on from generation to
generation. Types are acquired not only through socialisation and education nonethe-
less, but also develop by the explication and sedimentation of our own experiences. The
matrix of typified experiences constitutes our primary source of knowledge, or the
subjective stock of knowledge as mentioned earlier. The stock of knowledge is our
interpretative toolkit, but also serves as guidance for us to act in an appropriate, typical
way in a particular, typical situation. Schutz bases this compass function of the stock of
knowledge on the correlative assumptions that Husserl calls “and so forth” and “I-can-
do-it-again”. Simply put, the former means that the validity and meaning of our
experiences is relatively constant over time, and the latter refers to our ability to
replicate previously successful actions to achieve a designated aim in a similar situation
(Schutz 2011, pp. 125–128; Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 7, 238–241).
Types are not monoliths but are modified and replaced if necessary. Types are only
taken for granted “until further notice”, i.e. until contradiction or until a circumstance
motivates us to revise our assumptions (Schutz 1970, pp. 74–76, 116–122; 1972, pp.
181–201). As already mentioned, types and schemes are correlated and merged with
relevance, and always point to a problem and the underlying interest. That is, types are
taken for granted as long as they solve a problem, i.e. they sufficiently determine the
object of my experience as something I already know and familiar with, and no further
investigation is necessary for my actual purpose. If I encounter an atypical or unfamiliar
object which does not sufficiently fit the type, i.e. the experience is “novel”, the validity
of the type becomes questionable. Based on the overall characteristics of the object
determined by a deeper scrutiny, I then have to narrow down, expand or entirely
replace the type. However, everything has its horizon of “determinable indeterminacy”
and a change of purpose itself may convert taken for granted things into something
problematic. Familiarity with the typical aspects of mushrooms which distinguish them
from animals and plants is not sufficient enough to decide whether they are edible or
poisonous. That is, it cannot be taken for granted that a particular mushroom is edible
just because it is 100 % a mushroom. Only after further investigation and the estab-
lishment of subcategories I can pick mushrooms that look like, e.g. a Champignon
assuming they are harmless, but only until further notice (Schutz 2011, pp. 125–129;
Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 8–15).
3 Knowledge and society
3.1 Personal knowledge - subjective stock of knowledge
The preliminary categories of knowledge that SCA operationalises are social knowl-
edge and personal knowledge. The latter is defined as the “justified beliefs of individual
members acquired by applying the epistemic criteria of their community to their
personal experiences and inferences” (Van Dijk 2014a, p. 21). Personal knowledge
acquisition, i.e. the construction of mental models, is predominantly done against the
background of socially shared knowledge, but mental models evolve as they are
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reappropriated and updated in line with individuals’ new experiences and interactions
with others (Van Dijk 2014a, pp. 47–89; 2015a, b, p. 67; 2018, pp. 56–110).
In terms of phenomenological sociology, knowledge acquisition is the sedimentation
of already constituted experiences in the subjective stock of knowledge, the matrix of
schemes, relevance and types. The totality of SCA’s mental models (situation- and
context-models) is nothing less than this subjective stock of knowledge that helps us to
determine “here and now” experiences. As already implied, each previously
sedimented experience in the subjective stock of knowledge relates to our “pragmatic”
or “plan-determined” interest in a particular type of situation. In other words, the
typicality of experiences, hence that of the situation in which they occur, is conditioned
by relevance (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 182–243; Schutz 1962, p. 134). Because
we encounter the world in situations, i.e. experiences always occur in situations, and
each situation is “defined and mastered” based on the stock of knowledge, Schutz and
Luckmann call this relation as the “situation-relatedness” of the stock of knowledge.
Schutz and Luckmann note that both the situation and the subjective stock of
knowledge have a historicity: the latter is the sum of all the previous experiences
sedimented in it; the former is always recognised and understood as a result of prior
situations. More significantly, situations and experiences are sequentially defined over
the life span of each individual, i.e. they are “biographically articulated”. As discussed
earlier, the meaning of an experience is the aggregate function of all prior accumulated
experiences the stock of knowledge comprises at that particular moment; the same
applies to each previous element of the stock of knowledge at its respective stage of
incorporation. That is, the stock of knowledge has a highly individualised, layered
structure. Moreover, the intensity, the duration and the frequency of experiences vary
from person to person. Thus, as Schutz and Luckmann point out, although experiences
are sedimented in an “idealised” and “verbally objectivated” form, the stock always has
a unique, private and constantly evolving character (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp.
52–58, 99–122; Schutz 1972, pp. 74–78; 1962, pp. 9–10).
However, only a small part of the subjective stock of knowledge is construed by the
“independent” and situational interpretative process described above; mental models
are derived primarily from socially shared knowledge. First of all, the relevance-system
that underlies the individual sedimentation process is socially conditioned. As Schutz
notes, it is because the private interest of the individual always relates to the interests of
others; the situation in which it occurs, no matter how it is defined by the individual, is
always a social situation (Schutz 1970, p. 121). For Schutz, intersubjectivity is a
“fundamental ontological category of human existence”, a precondition of all our
immediate experiences (Schutz 1970, p. 31). The vast majority of the subjective stock
of knowledge derives from the socially objectivated experiences of others, i.e. the
social stock of knowledge. Again, it must be stressed that due to the subjective
biographical incorporation, it necessarily undergoes certain reconfiguration in line with
the individual’s prevailing meaning-contexts. In other words, and in terms of SCA,
mental models, although “abstracted” from shared, general knowledge, but at the same
time are always personal and unique (Van Dijk 2014a, p. 51).
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3.1.1 Internalisation
The socially derived facet of the subjective stock of knowledge is essentially developed
by the learning process of internalisation (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 243–261,
312). Taking Schutz’s work as a point of departure, Berger and Luckmann have
developed a comprehensive framework of the social construction of knowledge; how
it is externalised, objectified and internalised (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Berger
1969, p. 4). They extensively analysed the correlative relationship between objective-
and subjective reality, i.e. between the taken-for-granted, common-sense world and its
subjectively meaningful representation by the individual. They argued that the con-
struction of subjective reality, or knowledge acquisition, is done by the internalisation
of institutions, i.e. objectified and habitualised practices and behaviour patterns that we
learn during our socialisation (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 247–261; Berger and
Luckmann 1967, pp. 70–109). The authors assign a crucial role to significant others
who are “in charge” of our socialisation (Ibid., pp. 151–152). Significant others are our
first point of contact to the world, who “mediate” the world to us. Their understanding
and definitions of things, situations are taken for granted by us. Not only do we
interpret things and assign a meaning to them as passed on by significant others, but
we only get familiar with those things that our significant others find important to get
familiar with. In other words, we learn about the world selectively and through a filter
determined by our respective significant others’ position in the social structure, their
education, religion, taste, location, age, political preferences, and so on. Berger and
Luckmann note that our primary socialisation is not only a cognitive learning process
but is also “emotionally charged”. As a child, we identify with our significant others,
our parents in particular. Through internalisation, we make their attitudes, language,
roles our own by subjectively appropriating them. In that way identifying with our
significant others we acquire our identity of our own; i.e. our primary self is reflective.
Since identity consists of one’s understanding of, and attitude to, the world, through the
appropriation of their identity we simultaneously internalise their world. “Subjective
appropriation of identity and subjective appropriation of the social world are merely
different aspects of the same process of internalisation” (Ibid., p. 152). Once these
internalised behaviour patterns, views, beliefs, emotions and attitudes to worldly
objects and situations are mutually confirmed by our peers other than significant others,
they become generalised. Thus, the individual comes to identify with the society and
becomes its member; the individual internalises the objective-, common-sense reality.
“Society, identity and reality are subjectively crystallised in the same process of
internalisation” (Ibid., p. 153). By the abstraction of internalised institutions on a
general level, we establish a bridge between subjective and objective reality. Although
there is a constant communication and balancing between the two, we never really
internalise, or even are aware of, the latter in its entirety. It is simply because a) what is
passed on to us in the process of socialisation is determined by the spatially and
temporally (historically) fragmented social distribution of knowledge, as well as its
role-specific heterogeneity; and b) because knowledge acquisition is “biographically”
determined; it is both unique and finite (Ibid., p. 154; Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp.
256–261, 291–318).
What is decisive is that our understanding of the world, including ourselves,
is in constant dialectical relationship with the society: on the one hand, identity
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is shaped by social relations, processes and situations, and identity impacts
upon these social structures by maintaining, modifying or reshaping them:
“societies have histories in the course of which specific identities emerge; these
histories are, however, made by men with specific identities” (Berger and
Luckmann 1967, p. 194).
3.2 Social knowledge - social stock of knowledge
Social knowledge or social beliefs are defined by SCA as “the shared beliefs of an
epistemic community, justified by contextually, historically and culturally variable
(epistemic) criteria of reliability” (Van Dijk 2014a, p. 21). General, or socioculturally
shared knowledge is the category of social beliefs that is generally accepted in society
at large, while e.g. ideologies and prejudices are only shared by specific social groups.
Social knowledge is socially acquired, shared and communicated, and always relates to
socially relevant issues (Van Dijk 2014a, pp. 85–138).
As mentioned in the previous section, socially shared knowledge is the primary
source of our mental models. What still has not been discussed is how the social stock of
knowledge itself is constructed. As Schutz and Luckmann point out, although subjective
acquisition of knowledge would be theoretically possible without the social stock of
knowledge, developing the latter without the former is manifestly absurd. The funda-
mental origin of the socially shared knowledge is personal knowledge, and the trans-
ference of the latter into the former is done by its objectivation (Schutz and Luckmann
1974, pp. 262–265).With Van Dijk’s words: “we use mental models to construe generic
knowledge by abstraction and generalization” (Van Dijk 2014a, p. 85).
The basic level of objectivation is when a subjectively acquired knowledge that
solves a problem is “imitated” by others, whereby it becomes a taken-for-granted
“recipe” knowledge or skill of the entire community. However, this “pre-symbolic”
form of objectivation is still physically bound to the situation in which the original
subjective experience occurred. As already implied earlier, it is only an objectivation
done by a mutually shared system of signs, i.e. by language, that can “anonymise” and
“idealise” the experience and make it meaningfully transferable regardless of the
original spatial, temporal and biographical attributes of the experience (Schutz and
Luckmann 1974, pp. 261–286). Although objectivation is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient condition for subjective knowledge to be incorporated into the social stock of
knowledge; it must also be socially relevant, a solution to a typical problem. In other
words, the social stock of knowledge is a depository of solutions to everyday, “typi-
cally similar problems” of the community (Ibid., pp. 287–291). More significantly, this
“accumulation” of the social stock of knowledge is a historical process that varies
between societies, hence the stratification of the stock of knowledge is never uniform. It
is always determined by the prevailing social structure and, from the ground up, by the
first-order objectivations as the fundamental worldview of the community (Ibid., pp.
295–299, 305–308). Thus, language always reflects and transmits a particular histor-
ically and socially pre-constructed reality (Schutz and Luckmann 1989, pp. 148–157).
In other words, the social world presents itself from a perspective which always mirrors
the particular linguistic and cultural settings of a given society at a particular time. This
is precisely because language reflects the relevance structure prevailing in a certain
historical community that found an experience significant and relevant enough to
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assign a separate term for it (Schutz 1970, p. 96). Language objectifies and typifies
experiences and situations, and simultaneously incorporates them into the social stock
of knowledge, thus making them available for all members of the collectivity to
describe similar experiences. Because this sedimentation of knowledge has a spatial
and temporal arrangement, language becomes the “depository” of intersubjectively
objectified experiences of a particular community in a given historical period (Berger
and Luckmann 1967, pp. 53–56, 85–89; Schutz 1970, pp. 96–98; Schutz and
Luckmann 1974, pp. 233–235, 247–251).
3.2.1 Epistemic communities and the social distribution of knowledge
Epistemic communities are “collectivities of social actors sharing the same knowledge”
(Van Dijk 2014a, p. 147). Membership in epistemic communities always presupposes a
shared knowledge being in place to behave, act and interact appropriately within the
community and collectively towards shared goals and objectives (Van Dijk 2014a, pp.
139–154). Shared knowledge may vary between epistemic communities; what is taken-
for-granted in one, it might be considered false in another (Van Dijk 2012b).
Generally relevant knowledge is the category of the social stock of knowledge that
relates to problems that concern everyone in the community; e.g. we all lock the door
when leaving home (and wash our hands upon return for that matter). However, the
system of problems, i.e. the relevance structure of a society is not homogeneous. The
social stock of knowledge relieves individuals from developing solutions to familiar
recurring issues, thus they are able to turn towards new and more complex ones.
Certain problems become relevant and shared only by specific groups of the society,
and the related knowledge is, accordingly, passed on within these groups only. In other
words, certain layers of the social stock of knowledge are clustered and bound to roles
(Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 291–295). Formally put, performing a role means
performing certain socially objectified and typified actions that occur in the meaning
context of a particular cluster of the social stock of knowledge shared by a collectivity
of actors of the same type. This is why Berger and Luckmann note that objective
reality, i.e. the social world, manifests by means of roles (Berger and Luckmann 1967,
pp. 89–96). While generally shared knowledge remains accessible to everyone, role-
specific knowledge becomes structurally differentiated and relatively isolated as a result
of the historical accumulation process within the respective epistemic group. Moreover,
the “relief” of out-group members to be able to turn to “specialists” whenever a
problem occurs outside the province of the generally shared knowledge results in the
institutionalisation of role-specific knowledge. Essentially this process accounts for the
division of labour in a society, as well as for the “inequalities” in the social distribution
of knowledge (Schutz and Luckmann 1974, pp. 299–316). The more autonomous and
inaccessible the special knowledge becomes, the more chances there are for power
struggles for dominance being involved in its distribution: “group of experts form one
of the institutional catalysts of power concentration” (Ibid., p. 315).
As a result of the historical accumulation, the distribution of special- and
general knowledge within the social stock of knowledge is never constant. The
latter can develop into the former and vice versa, promoted or restricted under the
control of certain interest groups. As has been mentioned, due to the complexity of
the social structure, different “versions” of the general knowledge necessarily
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develop. Not only that, certain versions of the shared knowledge might become
the “special property” of certain social groups and live on in the form of ideol-
ogies. The subjective acquisition of knowledge is never definitively complete.
New problems occur, and things may reveal new aspects when looked at from
different perspectives whenever we interact with members of other epistemic
communities (Ibid., pp. 312–321, 326–327; cf. Van Dijk 2015a, b, p. 71).
3.3 Legitimation
SCA assigns a crucial role to legitimation in knowledge acquisition. Ideologies, certain
attitudes and opinions are only shared by specific groups in the community. In order to
be accepted by others, they have to be appropriately tailored and presented in a way in
which the target audience can easily identify with the purpose of the speaker (Van Dijk
2014a, p. 92). Successful transmission of such knowledge depends not only on the
reliability of the source, but a Common Ground must be established between the
speaker and receiver in the particular communicative situation. Depending on the
relevance structures and interests of the audience, asylum seekers, for example, can
be portrayed both as people fleeing war zones, or as a burden to the welfare system. In
short, knowledge is considered legitimate by the receiver, if and only if integrative and
well-formatted with reference to the shared beliefs, common-sense knowledge, prob-
lems, attitudes and (discursive) practices of the particular social group the receiver
belongs to (Van Dijk 2014a, pp. 153–155, 117–120, 222–309). Legitimation is essen-
tially the explanation, justification and rationalization of claims and actions of the
speaker indicating that they fall within the existing legal-, political-, moral-, i.e. the
overall social order of the community (Van Dijk 1998, pp. 255–262).
Berger and Luckmann define legitimation as the “second-order objectivation of
meaning” to facilitate the cognitive and normative integration of first-order
objectivations that are already institutionalised. The purpose of legitimation is to
preserve the plausibility of the institutional order as a whole and make it subjectively
meaningful and objectively available for the (second generation) members of the
community (Berger and Luckmann 1967, pp. 110–146). Legitimation explains and
justifies the institutional order by “ascribing cognitive validity to its objectified mean-
ings” and “giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives”; stories, proverbs and
theories are instrumental for that purpose (Ibid., pp. 111–113). Not only that, the
acceptance of a newly introduced institution depends on whether it is recognised as a
“permanent” solution to a “permanent” problem of the community (Ibid., 1967, p. 87).
Berger and Luckmann note if institutions are to be taken for granted, they have to be
justified not only in practical terms, but also by embedding them into a symbolic universe
(Ibid., pp. 110–134). As a result of symbolic legitimation, practices and activities prescribed
by institutions become uplifted as a mode of participation in a symbolic universe thus
transcending their everydayness. Symbolically legitimised knowledge might persist even if
they lose functionality or relevance; not because they would be necessary or “work” but
because they are “right” and pivotal to preserve the tradition (Ibid., p. 135; Schutz and
Luckmann 1974, p. 298). Taking the example of the police as an epistemic community, e.g.
the controversial stop and search practices can be portrayed by the legitimator not only as
necessary to chase criminals, but simultaneously as something the “watchers” or “guardians
of people” would do in order to serve the public, to protect the citizenry and to enforce the
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law. Similarly to ideologies, symbolic legitimation links past, present and future by
prompting the collective memory, thereby creating a frame of reference within which the
community functions (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 120). Embedding, for example, a
new policy proposal in the historical continuum provides a cohesive and transcendent
significance for the proposal. David Cameron, then PM of the UK, praised the “legacy”
of Magna Carta in his attempt to replace the Human Rights Act with a “British Bill of
Rights” in order to dodge the jurisdiction of the European Court of HumanRights. He did so
precisely because the problem of legitimation arises when the institutional order itself is
about to change.
Van Dijk defines referential local coherence as “the relations between the facts referred
to by the discourse and those represented subjectively in the situation model of the
discourse” (Van Dijk 2014a, pp. 249–250). As Berger and Luckmann argue, when new
institutions are to be introduced replacing or complementing old ones, the former must be in
balance with the knowledge, values and beliefs related to the latter. In other words, the
transmission of meanings associated with pre-existing institutions to new ones, with
reference to the “salient elements” of the overall institutional order, is crucial to preserve
plausibility. New institutions must be aligned with the general values of the community. For
example, reforms and policy proposals affecting an epistemic communitymust be translated
into pre-existing schemas, behaviour patterns and practices, and meet the objectives of the
community. Members of a community can identify with new institutions only if both the
purpose of the institution and the actions prescribed to achieve that purpose are plausible and
fit well within their roles (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1967, pp. 110–122, 157–164).
3.3.1 Delegitimation and universe-maintenance
Since multiple symbolic universes exist, universe- or reality-maintenance and neutralisation
of competing universes is necessary to preserve plausibility for the community. The very
existence of alternative and competing universes poses threat to the claimed inevitability of a
particular institutional order (Berger and Luckmann 1967, pp. 126–146, 166–182). In other
words, delegitimation of rival ideologies is an important aspect of the legitimation process
(Van Dijk 1998, p. 258). Neutralisation may take place by the incorporation and merge of
conflicting objectives and arguments with one’s own to enrich and strengthen the latter, or
by their “segregation” as deviant and only appropriate for different cultural communities
(Berger and Luckmann 1967, pp. 138–140).
However, the more artificial the character of certain knowledge to be transmitted is, the
more vulnerable it becomes to competing views, and as such it is prone to displacement
(Berger and Luckmann 1967, p. 167). The transmitted knowledge must be in relative
balance not only with pre-existing in-group knowledge, but also with that of other epistemic
communities, i.e. the rest of the society. The validity of knowledge must be confirmed in
social processes during interaction with others. The explicit and emotional confirmation by
our significant others, but virtually everyone we encounter in everyday life, play an
important role in this universe-maintenance in order to preserve the plausibility structure.
If, on the one hand, such confirmation is missing, but a competing legitimating apparatus is
in place that disintegrates the current system of knowledge, on the other, the rejection and
transformation of identity might be a possible outcome; the authors bring religious conver-
sion as an example (Ibid., pp. 165–182).
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4 Conclusion
This article argues that phenomenological sociology remains increasingly rele-
vant to sociological research. Phenomenology, or as Schutz (1978, p. 140)
phrased it, “the treasure of knowledge opened up by Husserl” has been long
neglected by contemporary social sciences. Schutz and his successors fused
phenomenology with sociology and developed a comprehensive framework
analysing the interrelated structures of subjectivity, knowledge and the social
world. That is, phenomenological sociologists extensively analysed the subject
matter of the Sociocognitive Approach in Critical Discourse Studies. Among
others, the concept of scheme, type, relevance, subjective- and social stock of
knowledge are highly instrumental in understanding how mental models and the
socially shared knowledge are constructed and function in a communicative
situation. Schutz’s theory of intersubjective understanding, the concept of signs,
the interpretive- and expressive function of language and his analysis of the
We-relationship provide a strong theoretical support to understand the processes
that control discourse production and interpretation, and how participants can
infer each other’s subjective meaning (intentions) in a communicative situation.
Schutz’s analytical framework is systematic, brilliantly nuanced and detailed,
therefore the scope of the article is extremely, and necessarily, limited; nor does
it discuss the underlying concepts developed by Husserl. The potential of
phenomenological sociology to provide a strong theoretical support for SCA
has nonetheless been demonstrated and should be clear, which will hopefully
draw the attention of critical discourse analysts to an unduly sidelined field.
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